Abstract-The transition to a more sustainable energy system requires investment in renewable energy technologies such as wind. Due to the dispersed nature of sites for wind farms, concomitant expansion of the transmission network is also necessary. While the two objectives could be reconciled within the auspices of a regulated welfare-maximising planner, recent restructuring of electricity industries has introduced a merchant model for transmission investment, which provides congestion rents from construction of a new line. Thus, the merchant investor's incentives are different from those of producers carrying out investment in wind farms. In this paper, we analyse the interaction between the two conflicting objectives under various assumptions about the electricity market structure and the degree of producers' market power. Via a three-node illustrative example, we show that a merchant investor typically builds less transmission capacity than a welfare-maximising transmission system operator or central planner. Although social welfare is lower and nodal prices are generally higher with a merchant investor and when producers are assumed to behaveà la Cournot, the effect of lower price response at the dominant demand node is to increase concentration of generation capacity. Hence, the distributional effects of transmission expansion depend on the relative supply-demand balance throughout the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
The twin pressures of deregulation and the transition to a more sustainable energy system necessitate unprecedented levels of investment in generation and transmission capacity. In particular, EU objectives to reduce CO 2 emissions by at least 80% relative to 1990 levels by 2050 mean that the electricity industry must decarbonise almost completely [1] . Facilitating this transformation will be the development and deployment of alternative energy technologies, e.g., carbon capture and sequestration, off-shore wind, and tidal power. Wind has already seen rapid adoption recently with a tripling of installed capacity in the past five years from 93 GW to 282 GW, which is due mostly to on-shore projects [2] . However, unlike conventional generation, which may be located in proximity to population centres, or traditional baseload facilities like hydropower and nuclear stations, which are large enough to require well-defined transmission corridors, wind sites may be remotely dispersed. Hence, investment in new wind capacity often requires coordinated expansion of multiple transmission lines.
Traditionally, under the vertically integrated paradigm, a regulated transmission system operator (TSO) would plan the expansion of the grid with the objective of maximising social welfare [3] . In this setup, the TSO jointly determines investment in transmission and wind in an upper-level problem in order to minimise social costs while taking into account scenario-specific market outcomes from lower-level marketclearing problems. This bi-level problem is a stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) [4] , i.e., the TSO's investment decisions are made in anticipation of market-clearing scenarios. Such a welfare-maximising approach may require incentive regulation of the TSO in order to deliver efficient market outcomes, however. An alternative market-based merchant model has, therefore, been proposed in which transmission rights are allocated to investors in return for the construction of lines [5] . Nevertheless, it may lead to under-investment in transmission capacity if electricity markets are imperfectly competitive [6] . To facilitate the attainment of sustainability objectives without blunting the market's efficiency, it is, thus, necessary to investigate the merchant approach under different wholesale electricity market structures (perfect competition or Cournot oligopoly for the producers).
In this paper, we analyse merchant transmission investment for a stylised electricity industry. We assume that a merchant investor (MI) decides in the upper level where to build transmission capacity from which it earns congestion rents via transmission allocation in the lower level, while producers solve lower-level problems to determine new generation capacity and output. Given price-responsive demand at each node and supply-demand equilibrium, the transmission service that the MI provides must equal the electricity dispatched along each link. For now, we assume that the MI is dominant in the electricity industry, i.e., it can anticipate the decisions of the producers, who behave either perfectly competitively orà la Cournot. In either case, the presence of a dominant MI leads to an MPEC. Via numerical examples, we examine how the optimal transmission capacity differs depending on the producers' market power. Furthermore, we obtain insights about the impact of transmission expansion on social welfare by comparing the behaviour of the MI with a welfare-maximising central planner (CP), which makes all investment and operational decisions, and a welfare-maximising TSO, which makes only transmission investment and allocation decisions leaving generation investment and output to producers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:
• Section II formulates optimisation problems corresponding to MI, TSO, and CP market settings and derives Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality • Section III provides numerical examples for our stylised network and discusses their implications for transmission expansion, generation investment, and social welfare • Section IV summarises the results and offers directions for future research
II. MODEL

Indices and Sets
• n: node index, n ∈ N • i: producer index, i ∈ I • i : alias index for i, i ∈ I • I g : set of conventional producers, I g ⊂ I • I w : set of wind producers,
set of lines connected to node n • L n + : set of lines starting at node n • L n − : set of lines ending at node n • n + : node index for starting node of line
• n − : node index for ending node of line
Parameters
• A n : intercept of the inverse demand curve at node n (e/MWh) • B n : slope of the inverse demand curve at node n (e/MWh 2 )
• E n : capacity factor for wind energy production at node n (-) • C inv ni capacity investment cost of producer i at node n (e/MWh) • C a ni : coefficient for the linear production cost term of producer i at node n (e/MWh) • C b ni : coefficient for the quadratic production cost term of producer i at node n (e/MWh 2 )
• C arc : cost of transmission expansion at line (e/MWh)
• H : transmission efficiency of line (-)
• K prod ni : production capacity of producer i at node n (MWh) • K arc : transmission capacity of line (MWh)
• Θ i in : conjectured response of producer i on the change in sold electricity by producer i at node n (-)
• f : installed transmission capacity for line (MWh)
• p n : price of electricity at node n (e/MWh) 
A. Assumptions
We assume that each node n ∈ N in our transmission grid has its own linear inverse demand, A n −B n i∈I q sell ni , which depends on the amount of electricity that is sold at the node by all producers in equilibrium. A given line connects a pair of nodes uni-directionally, e.g., line starts at node n + and ends at node n − . For now, we disregard loop flows and uncertainty in demand or wind availability. Also, we consider a single representative time period.
Each producer may be classified as being either conventional, e.g., fossil fuel, or wind. The distinction is that conventional producers, i ∈ I g , have quadratic cost functions, while wind producers, i ∈ I w , do not incur operational costs, i.e., C a ni = C b ni = 0. In addition, conventional producers can decide how much to produce, whereas wind production is determined by the capacity factor, E n . Note that any producer can install capacity at multiple nodes and can sell electricity generated at one node at a different one provided that it can access sufficient transmission capacity, which is in line with most complementarity models for the energy sector [7] .
Regardless of the transmission expansion setup, each producer i ∈ I is part of an open-loop Cournot oligopoly or perfectly competitive industry and jointly solves for its profitmaximising optimal generation investment and operational decisions [8] . The degree of market power is reflected by the the conjectured price response, which is the first derivative of the inverse demand function, p n , in terms of electricity sold, q
where:
Thus, we model perfect competition when i =i Θ i in = −1 and a Cournot oligopoly when i =i Θ i in = 0. Finally, it is worth emphasising that in open-loop equilibria, the operational decisions of the producers also encompass generation and sales at each node along with electricity transmitted on each link. Transmission investment and capacity allocation is handled by a single MI. Like the producers, this agent is motivated by the incentive to maximise profit, which in its case is the revenue collected from transmission rents less the cost of capacity expansion. In particular, the congestion rent earned by the MI on a given link is the shadow price of transmission capacity, i.e., the dual variable on the market-clearing condition that balances capacity rented out by the MI with the transmission capacity required by all producers. While the producers are supposed to behave eitherà la Cournot or perfectly competitively, the MI is assumed to be dominant. This assumption implies that the MI first decides on transmission investment, which is followed by the producers' investment, generation, and flow decisions. Concurrently with the producers' operational decisions, the MI decides how much transmission capacity to lease out. This leads to a bi-level MPEC setup with the MI's transmission expansion decision at the upper level constrained by the producers' open-loop equilibrium (Cournot oligopoly game or perfect competition), market-clearing conditions for transmission flow, and capacity limits on transmission flow at the lower level (Fig. 1) . By contrast, if all decisions were made at the same level, then we would have a mixed-complementarity problem (MCP) as in [9] . Furthermore, besides an open-loop setup, we could have a closed-loop one in which producers' investment and operational decisions are made at different stages. As described in [8] , such an assumption would lead to an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). As a benchmark, we also consider setups with welfaremaximising CP and TSO. Since the benevolent CP controls all aspects of the energy market, it decides on the transmission expansion and generation investment at the same time as the production allocation. Therefore, the CP's welfare-maximisation is formulated as a non-linear programming problem (NLP). On the other hand, similar to the MI, the welfare-maximising TSO can decide only the transmission investment and the leasing, while the generation investment, output, and sales decisions remain with the producers. By contrast, instead of profit, the TSO aims to maximise the social welfare of the electricity industry.
B. Problem Formulation with the Merchant Investor
The revenue of producer i is given by the quantity that it sells at every node n multiplied by the nodal price, a n − b n i∈I q sell ni . In general, the producers' costs consist of operational, transmission, and investment costs. We assume that transmission and investment costs are linear, whereas operational costs are quadratic in Eq. (2). Thus, producer i's optimisation problem is:
Generation is constrained by installed capacity via either Eq. (3) or (4) depending on the type of generator. For example, conventional producers have flexibility over their output, whereas wind producers generate according to resource availability. Eq. (5) states that the amount produced plus imported at each node by each producer i has to match that producer's committed sales plus any exports. Finally, non-negativity constraints are imposed in Eq. (6) . Thus, the problem in Eqs. (2) through (6) is solved for each producer i ∈ I with either Eq. (3) or (4) serving as the capacity constraint depending on whether i ∈ I g or i ∈ I w .
The KKT conditions for the producers are as follows:
∀ ∈ L, ∀i ∈ I
with free variable λ prod ni , ∀n ∈ N , ∀i ∈ I w q prod ni
with free variable φ ni , ∀n ∈ N , ∀i ∈ I.
Furthermore, a market-clearing condition in Eq. (16) links transmission allocated by the MI to that required by the producers:
∀ ∈ L
Also at the lower level is the MI's problem of allocating transmission capacity in order to maximise its profit subject to the transmission capacity constraint in which f is fixed at the upper level:
Its KKT conditions are as follows: In particular, we are interested in τ arc , which is the dual variable on the market-clearing condition for transmission and is precisely the congestion rent on line . Finally, nodal prices may be calculated using the quantities sold at each node, i∈I q sell ni . The upper-level optimisation problem for the MI involves maximising its profit (given by the revenues from congestion rents minus the cost of building transmission lines) subject to the lower-level optimisation problems. It is a closed-loop problem with the MI's lower level in Eqs. (17)-(19) . Now, the lower-level problems may be replaced by their KKT conditions as expressed in Eqs. (7)- (15) and (20)- (21) along with the market-clearing condition in Eq. (16), which yields the following MPEC:
s. t. Eqs. (7)- (16), (20)
Here, the notation f ∪ Ω ∪ Ξ means that f is an upper-level decision variable, Ω is the set of lower-level primary decision variables, and Ξ is the set of dual variables of the lower-level problem. Hence, we have converted a bi-level optimisation problem into a single-level, non-linear optimisation problem.
C. Problem Formulation with the Transmission System Operator
Like the MI, the TSO decides only on the transmission investment and leased capacity, but it maximises the social welfare rather than its profit. Here, the social welfare is calculated as the sum of the surpluses of the consumers and producers minus the cost of transmission expansion. For reference, the producers' surplus is simply the profit in Eq. (2), and the consumers' surplus is the area between the inverse demand curve and the market-clearing price. Consequently, the TSO's optimisation problem is subject to optimality in the lower level along with the market-clearing condition, which results in the following MPEC:
D. Problem Formulation with the Central Planner
Under the CP, decisions are not made by producers. Instead, a benevolent CP makes all decisions in order to maximise social welfare. Thus, the CP's NLP is:
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Data
We use a three-node network with no initial transmission capacities (Table I) . Transmission investment can occur in lines connecting any pair of nodes in either direction at the same per-unit investment cost. Using this nodal network (see Fig.  2 for a realisation with the TSO), we solve either the MPEC or NLP in each market setting (MI, TSO, or CP) with two different parameter sets assuming either Cournot oligopoly or perfect competition. Thus, we have twelve distinct numerical examples. In Example 1, node 2 has the highest demand with initial conventional capacity (Table II) . Wind investment is permissible at nodes 1 and 3 with a higher capacity factor at the former. Conventional capacity investment is allowed only at node 2. Example 2 has similar data but with lower price response at node 2, i.e., a higher value for B 2 , without changing the maximum possible demand, i.e., the ratio of A 2 to B 2 . 
B. Results
The models are implemented in GAMS and solved with CONOPT3 version 3.14v. The required CPU time to solve these problems with a 2.80 GHz processor and 8 GB of RAM is less than 4 seconds. In Example 1, the MI invests in lines 1, 2, and 6 under both perfect competition (Table  III) and Cournot oligopoly (Table IV) . Node 2 has by far the highest demand, which cannot be adequately satisfied with the incumbent conventional generation. Furthermore, because of its quadratic cost function, it would be relatively expensive to expand conventional capacity in order to satisfy the demand. On the other hand, wind energy at node 1 is more competitive at producing large amounts of electricity as it does not bear variable cost. It is also more efficient than wind energy at node 3 since its capacity factor is higher. Thus, the producer at node 1 has the greatest incentive to expand capacity and to transmit electricity to node 2, where it can earn the highest nodal price, along with some sales at node 3 as long as the congestion rent is not excessive. Interestingly, although wind resources at node 3 are lower than those at node 1, the producer at node 3 is more willing to sell electricity at node 2 because it facilitates the profit maximisation of the MI. Indeed, if we fix f 6 = 0, then generation capacity expansion by the producer at node 1 does not contribute as much to the MI's profit as sales by the producer at node 3. Since 
the MI's profits depend on the congestion rents it earns, it has the reinforcing incentive to construct lines 1, 2, and 6. Under Cournot oligopoly, all producers have the incentive to withhold capacity in order to increase revenues. Indeed, generation investment is lower relative to the case with perfect competition with higher producer profits and nodal prices. However, the MI is worse off under Cournot oligopoly with lower profits even though the congestion rent on each line is higher. Intuitively, the market power that each producer can exercise stymies the need for transmission, which means that the MI must reduce its transmission investment. Moreover, social welfare decreases under Cournot oligopoly as expected.
As a benchmark, we also investigate TSO and CP outcomes. Under the former, a transition from perfect competition to a Cournot oligopoly yields intuitive results: generation investment decreases along with social welfare and transmission capacity, while the producers' and the TSO's profits increase along with nodal prices. Compared to the MI, the TSO setting delivers higher total transmission investment and greater social welfare along with lower nodal prices and profit for the TSO. Since social welfare could be increased by lowering the price at node 2, the TSO invests substantially in lines 1 and 6, which enables more sales by producers at nodes 1 and 3 at node 2. At the same time, the producer at node 2 invests in less generation capacity (unlike wind producers), which sees its profits reduced. In effect, the welfare-maximising incentive of the TSO and the lower congestion rent lead to more power transmitted from the nodes with wind to node 2. Meanwhile, under CP, there is no difference between perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. In line with intuition, the CP delivers higher social welfare and investment of all kind (except for conventional generation) along with lower nodal prices relative to the MI setting. Although there is more transmission capacity in total, it is mostly concentrated on line 1 in order to transfer the cheapest generation to where it is most valued.
In Example 2, the MI invests in lines 1 and 2 under both perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. Interestingly, the lower price response at node 2 increases capacity in line 1, leaves line 2 unaffected, and removes line 6 altogether. Relative to Example 1, the lower leverage of consumers at node 2 benefits the conventional producer, which can increase output without affecting the nodal price to the same extent. The wind producer at node 1 also takes advantage of the higher price at node 2 to increase its investment and to transmit more electricity along line 1 in spite of the higher congestion charge. Consequently, the MI has the incentive to increase capacity on line 1. However, since the less price-responsive consumers at node 2 can be exploited more effectively by the conventional producer and to some extent by the efficient wind producer at node 1, the relatively inefficient wind producer at node 3 loses out. Thus, its generation investment drops, and line 6 is not constructed. In summary, lower price response at the major demand node leads to a concentration of generation by fewer producers and fewer transmission lines constructed even if the total amount of transmission capacity available increases. The move from perfect competition to Cournot oligopoly within Example 2 has generally the same outcomes as in Example 1 with one exception: generation capacity at node 3 actually increases. Intuitively, withholding by the producer at node 1 creates an opportunity for the producer at node 3 to pick up some of the sales at its own node. Unlike in Example 1, it has no leverage to raise profits by reducing sales at node 2.
The TSO setting experiences similar effects on transmission and generation investment in moving from Example 1 to 2. In particular, the inefficient wind producer at node 3 is driven out of business. Even a transition within Example 2 to Cournot oligopoly from perfect competition does not provide it with the chance to re-gain a foothold in the industry. Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, the electricity industry becomes more concentrated with a lower share for wind under the TSO than in Example 1 as a consequence of lower price response at node 2. As for the CP, lower price response at node 2 simply increases investment and generation by the efficient wind producer at node 1. The extra capacity is used to meet the excess demand at node 2, which is the most cost-effective solution and requires a coordinated increase in transmission capacity on line 1.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ongoing deregulation of the electric power industry and the drive towards a sustainable energy transition requires careful analysis of investment and operational decisions. Indeed, the level of investment in renewable energy technologies will have to be done on a large scale over the next three decades in order to achieve desired social objectives of reducing CO 2 emissions. Due to the dependency between investment in wind, which is central to most governments' decarbonisation strategies, and upgrades to the transmission network, a joint assessment is necessary.
In this paper, we use a complementarity approach to examine a merchant model for transmission investment with wind capacity to be handled separately by power producers. We find that the MI makes higher profits under perfect competition than when the producers competeà la Cournot. Furthermore, less price-reponsive demand at the highest-consumption node may lead to more concentration of generation and fewer transmission lines constructed. This intriguing result may be analysed in the context of [10] , which finds that generation quantities and emissions from integrating electricity markets depend on relative price elasticities of demands and emissions factors. In some situations, introduction of trade may even lower efficiency. Indeed, in Example 2, we observe that less competition actually sees more investment by the inefficient wind producer at node 3 under the MI, which is not the case under a TSO.
For future work, we would like to explore such outcomes more rigorously. One avenue of investigation is to introduce uncertainty in the form of scenarios for demands and wind availability. Another is to incorporate loop flows in our simple network. Finally, we would like to implement our model for an EU test network.
